Arguments for an extension of Piaget's theory of cognitive development have been derived from philosophical and historical consideration of modern natural sciences. Implicit contradictions, which characterize these sciences as well as common thought, can be systematically apprehended only through a dialectic reinterpretation. The dialectic basis of Piaget's theory is expressed in his assimilation-accommodation paradigm. But development is interpreted as a continuing alienation from this basis culminating in the noncontradictory thinking of formal operations. Although Piaget's interpretations capture a rich variety of performances during childhood they fail to represent adequately the thought and emotions of mature and creative peisons. For an interpretation of adulthood and aging, a return to the dialectic basis is necessary. Such a reorganization can proceed from any of the four major levels of development.
ABSTRACT
Arguments for an extension of Piaget's theory of cognitive development have been derived from philosophical and historical considerations of modern natural science. Implicit contradictions, which characterize tLese sciences as well as common thought, can be systematically apprehended only through a dialectic reinterpretation. The dialectic basis of Piaget's theory is expressed in his assimilation-accommodation paradigm, but development is interpreted as a continuing alienation from this basis, culminating in formal operations. Although Piaget's interpretations capture a rich variety of performance during childhood they fail to represent adequately the thought and emotions of mature and creative persons. For interpretations of adulthood and aging, a return to the dialectic basis is necessary. Such a reorganization can proceed from any of the four major levels of development. It introduces intra-and interindividual variations into Piaget's theory. Individuals may operate either simultaneously or in short succession at different cognitive levels. The ceaseless striving toward formal operations becomes inappropriate and ineffective for the level of dialectic maturity. (Author/DP) ft for one theory or the other, and in the selective performance of particular series of experiments. By separating the subject from the object of these observations their theories became abstract.
Modern scientists have realized that the activities of the observers are intimately connected with their scientific investigations. When dealing with subatomic particles, for example, it is n principle impossible to observe, with equal Precision, both their location in space and their movement in time.
Since each measurement exerts a causal effect upon the process observed, the investigator is prevented from separating these conditions from the measurements chosen. Both location and movement, or mass and velocity, have to be studied in their mutual dependence and in their dependence upon the observations. This recognition implies nothing else but to admit that the object is influenced by the subject.
The abstract status of classical natural sciences, for which the theory of mechanics represents a prototypical,example, was achieved through a strict adherence to the postulate of identity and the rejection of explicit or implicit contradictions. 2 The laws of classical mechanics--as well as those of any of the other theories of classical natural sciences--"represent idealizations at which we derive by considering only those portions of our experience, in which we can achieve an order with our concepts of space, time, etk.... [but] ...such a conceptualization of a world proceeding in objective space and time is, again, only an idealization of nature, carried out in the desire to objectify as much as possible [Heisenberg, 1942, pp. 41 and 94J." The theory of mechanics was built upon the traditional logic, the most important property of which is that observations, definitions, or postulates should be noncontradictory, i.e., A should always equal A, but not A at one time and B at another.
It was inconceivable, for example, that light could be a wave and a particle at the same time. Only one of these alternatives' could be true.
The issue of identity and contradiction separates Hegel's dialectic from the formal logic of his predecessors, especially Aristotle and Kant.
Hegel compares his own with traditional logic in the following manner: "But it is one of the basic prejudices of traditional logic and of common-sense conception that contradiction is not such an essential and immanent determination as identity; indeed, if we were to consider a rank orde and if both determinations were to be kept separated, contradiction would have to be accepted as deeper and more essential. For identity, in contrast to it, is only the recognition of the single immediate, the dead being; but contradiction is the source of all motion and vitality; only in so far as something contains contradiction does it move, has it drive and activity [Hegel, 1969a, p. 545, own translation] ."
The adherence to the principle of identity and noncontradiction characterizes both the scientists who are founding their inquiries upon the viewpoints of philosophical realism and those who prefer the experiential basis of positivism.
The former believe that their observations represent the objective conditions in space and time of the "real" world (most commonly within the Newtonian frame of reference). The observer can err or lack precision and sophistication but, ultimately, these shortcomings can be overcome and, thus, "true" answers can be "detected." The task for the philosophical realists is not to determine those principles which "...we are projecting into things in order to make them comprehensible and practically accessible to us, but those which can be detected by us in the things themselves [Bavink, 1940, p. 273] ."
The positivists do not subscribe to the metaphysical notion of "real" space and time in which "things" exist and "objective" processes take place.
They exclusively attend to the sensory-perceptual basis of knowledge and did not consider it the task of sciences to detect "explanations for processes in nature but to describe them as simply and as completely as possible. The genuine object of sciences are only the immediate observations and experiences themselves [Jordan, 1935, p. 37) ." But like the philosophical realists, they emphasize the need for noncontradictory statements. Thus, the first group reaches the abstractness of its interpretations through a belief in an objective world and by its disregard of the subject. The second group emphasizes the subjective nature of our knowledge but, by clinging to the principle of noncontradiction, advances toward the same abstract theories as the realists.'
A dismissal of the principle of identity and noncontradiction synthesizes both philosophical bases. Any theory derived from such a synthesis will be concrete rather than abstract. Abstract theories are disengaged from the observer.
Concrete theories take the intimate interdependence between subject and object into account. By abandoning the principle of identity, these theories also allow for the coexistence of different interpretations. Dialuctic interpenetration of subject and object and of contradictory theories is not only possible but positively necessary for science and knowledge. However, they
dissolve much of what, hitherto, has been clear and firm.
In the following pages we will demonstrate that dialectic conceptualization characterizes the origin of thought in the individual and in society. For the purpose of special logical constructions, mathematical models Cete or measu'ement systems, scientists will rely on it for formal explications.
The blind adherence to the identity principle and, thus, to classical logic, hinders, however, the understanding of the contradictory nature of human thought, especially during its very early stages during maturity and old age.
Hegel's dialectic theory. The same holds for classes and the general relations between them both of which, according to our interpretations (Riegel, 1970 (Riegel, , 1973b , can be deduced from the former.
But here again we are confronted with dialectic ambivalence. On the one hand, we might derive classes from sets of simple relations, such as the class of "actors" and the class of "actions." Conjoining them, we can, subsequently, define the genel.A. relation of "activity,' i.e., the general relation of "acting actors." On the other hand, we might consider this general relationship as given. Subsequently, we define the classes of "actors" and "actions" on the basis of this relationship. In either case, we unravel the interpenetration of elements and relations as well as those of classes and general relations.
Thereby, we derived abstract descriptions; concrete thought considers both explications in their mutual determination.
On the following pages we will elaborate the implications for developmental rqychology of the notion of dialectic interpenetration and of the dismissal of the identity principle.
In particular, we demonstrate these implications in regard to the development of logical operations with classes and of linguistic operations with explicit relations, i.e., comparative terms. In a third section we discuss some of the difficulties encountered when one tries to apply Piaget's theory to the study of maturity and aging. In a fourth section we summarize the necessary modification and extension of Piaget's theory of cognitive development.
Development of logical operations with classes. In considering Piaget's theory and observations of cognitive development, we recognize its dialectic basis.
This dialecticism is most clearly revealed in the accommodationassimilation paradigm leading to adaptation and readaptation. Accommodation denotes the changes of the subject to the object, for example the observing or eating child. Assimilation denotes the changes of the object to (for the benefit of) the subject, for example, the shifting into focus of the object visually searched or the physical and chemical changes of the eaten food. In the dialectic sense, both accommodation and assimilation are complementary; they are standing in contradictory, mutual relation. While Piaget's theory is based upon such a dialectic foundation, critics have often wondered how the accommodation-assimilation paradigm is carried forward into the interpretations of the higher stages of cognitive development.
Undoubtedly Piaget uses this paradigm skillfully and convincingly for depicting basic biological interactions as well as early cognitive differentiations, such as those of sucking, grasping, touching, as well as the coordination and e sequencing of these early schemata. In this regard, Piaget's descriptions resemble those operations denoted as syncretic by Werner (1926) . As soon as the child reaches the second major period in Piaget's theory, the period of preoperational intelligence, and as soon as Piaget shifts from a methodology of observational interpretations to those of experimentation, the dialectic paradigm of accommodation and assimilation is slowly abandoned or, at least, disregarded and the interpretations are proposed in terms of traditional logic.
For our discussion of the major periods in Piaget's theory, we rely on a much simplified interpretation of cognitive development by McLaughlin (1963) .
This interpretation deals exclusively with the operation of classes and regards development as a consecutive addition of dimensions of categorical judgments.
At the sensory-motor period the child recognizes object permanency but is not yet able to classify within a dimension; he is able to attend to only one concept at a time.
In order to categorize he would need to attend to at least one other concept or to negate the former, the attended concept.
The sensory-motor child focuses upon distinct singular objects that happen to come into his field of attention. Neither does he discriminate any of these objects against others nor against negative instances of the same object. For example, the child is able to focus upon a block, but he does not discriminate this block from beads and marbles or nonblocks in general.
All that he is able to do is to achieve a figure-ground differentiation.
The dialectic character of the early form of cognitive operations is expressed by the fluidity with which the attention of the child might switch from item to item or from figure to ground and from ground to figure.
The dialectic character is also revealed at the next higher level of cognitive operations corresponding to Piaget's period of preoperational thought. show ue continuing dialectic character of the child's thought and, later on, we will claim that the older, alienated child, in order to reach maturity, will have to return to a dialectic basis of thinking.
Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a theory of alienation.
Various research reports (see, for example, Piaget, 1962 Piaget, , 1963 Piaget, , 1965 Piaget & Inhelder, 1967) Regardless of whether one attributes these contradictory judgments to a change in the child's opinion, to a lack of short-term retention, or to disability to operate simultaneously with two attributional dimensions, development is seen by Piaget (as well as by almost all developmental psychologists) as removing these inconsistencies and as reaching toward a coherent, noncontradictory mode of thinking. These examples also show; however, that thinking originates from a dialectic basis and, as we will t-y to demonstrate, creative and mature thinking returns to its dialectic mode or rather fails to separate itself clearly and firmly from this foundation.
Additional support for our interpretation comes from a recent study by Miller (1972) with the specific purpose of examining children's reactions to the violation of their own expectancies concerning the conservation of weight. Eight-and ten-year-old nonconservers and conservers were studied under conditions where the outcome of the weighing of two clay balls could be overridden by the experimenter thus creating results inconsistent with the experience of at least the conserving children. Contrary to the investigator's expectation, observable surprise was infrequent and changes judgment were readily made. Contrary to some earlier findings, active resistance to change was apparent in about half the conservers but older conservers did not show resistance more often than young conservers.
Miller derives the interpretation of his findings from Piaget's notion of the "logical necessity" for the persistence of cognitive structures. This notion, in turn, derives from the concept of disequilibration. If a conflict is created through new experiences or cognitive changes, the organism tends to resolve such an incongruity.
If such an equilibration is not successfully achieved, the child, especially the younger one, might simply state his observation without persistent attempts to consolidate it wita his earlier conceptualization. In Piaget's theory, such a solution represents a regression toward an earlier level of operation. To us, it indicatas that the thoughts of the child are flexible enough to tolerate and to exist with ambiguities.
Eventually, through alienating training and abstractions, the child will be induced to consolidate these contradictions for the sake of educationally accepted interpretations. In principle, however, these contradictions remain to coexist even within the superimposed structures of later interpretations as demonstrated in the following report by Zaporozhets and Elkonin (1971) .
These authors asked children to test whether some small objects would float in a pan filled with water. At about 3 1/2 years of age, a child will successively propose various alternative reasons whenever his previous answer becomes incongruous with new experience. Thus, he will switch his interpretation from "It doesn't hold itself on water" (brass disk), to "It is small" (needle), to "It doesn't know how to swim." At an age of four to five years, a child is able to produce compouaded answers, e.g., "A splinter swims because it is little and it is light." Subsequently, he will be faced less often with contradictory experience. In emphasizing with Piaget the necessary development toward abstract and general structures, Zaporozhets and Elkonin conclude:
The child is so convinced of her own judgment that it is difficult for her to refute it even in the light of contradictory facts. However, does it mean then that the child is not aware of the contradictions, that she ignores reality whenever it dces not correspond to her understanding?
The observations show that this is not so [1971, p. 240] ."
The interpretations by the Soviet investigators agree with those by Piaget:
The thoughts of the young child are founded upon dialectic contradictions.
But increasing with age and experience, he acquires stable structures that consolidate contradictory evidence into consistent interpretations. In regard to floating objects, the child, at first, considers either the attribute small or the attribute light as criterial; later he begins to realize that objects have to be both small and light at the same time; still later he might relate their weight to their volume in form of a ratio, and he might consider whether the objects are hollow or solid, the type of liquid they we placed on, etc.
But as the child apprehends increasingly complex structures which consolidate all the contradictory evidence experienced, the different concrete observations remain to coexist, i.e., a small object floating, a small object sinking, a heavy object floating, a heavy object sinking, etc. Each new situation demands transformation of the experience into the consolidated structure.
Each new situation remains contradictory as each thought remains tied to its dialectic basis. As for a student puzzled by an ambiguous multiple choice item (add which item fails to be ambiguous), it matters little for an understanding of the student's thinking whether or not he finally finds the "correct" answer; what matters are the ambiguity and the contradictions that he experiences. Thinking, in the dialectic sense, is the process of transforming -15-contradictory experience into momentary stable structures. These structures consolidate the contradictory evidence but do not represent thinking; they merely represent the products of thinking.
Development of linguistic operations with relations. Recently, several studies explored the acquisition and use of comparative terms, such as "more"
and "less" or "tall," "taller" and "tallest." These investigations have been conducted and summarized either by emphasizing a linguistic (Clark, 1970) or a perceptual-cognitive basis (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971) . Undoubtedly, the study of comparative terms is intimately related to Piaget's work. In particular, 'As interpretations of conservation have been criticized for failing to take account of the child's ability to operate and comprehend such terms as "more," "less," "same," etc. (Griffiths, Shantz & Sigel, 1967; Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Bickford & Looft, 1972) .
According to the avrtilable evidence, simplified to a considerable extent, the following stages in the development of comparative terms may be distinguished. At level 1, when the child is producing single words only, expressions such as "more" are sometimes used by the child as imperative demands without comparative implications. Paraphrasing hir expression, the child seems to say "I want this here!" At level 2, when the child operates simultaneously with two terms, he might use such words as "more" in c.,11 absolute, dichotomizing manner, contrasting it with "not more" but hot implying a gradiation of magnitudes. At level 3, when the child operates simultaneously with three'terms, true transitivity and, subsequently, comparativity is established. For instance, the child might apply terms like "small, medium, tall" or "tall, taller, tallest." By dropping off either one of the extreme items of such a series, e.g., A < B < C, he is able to extend it without limitation.
-16-Level 3 represents an important step in an additional sense. All previous comparisons implied absolute anchor points. In one-term expressions, the condition and desire of the speaker himself serves as an absolute point of reference. In the two-term comparison, the expression "more" serves as the positive instance; "not more" represents merely its negation. At level 3, the anchor point becomes variable. Applying a spatial representation, usually the left hand term, as in "tall, taller, tallest," serves such a function, but can always be modified by adding a new element, such as "less tall," or --more radically--by extending the sequence into the opposite direction, i.e., "tall," "less tall," "least tall."
At level 4, when the child operates simultaneously with four terms, he ought to be able to make comparisons between two dichotomized variables and perform class multiplications such as between "wide and narrow vs. short and If an object is fast, when compared within a fixed system of coordinates, but slow, when compared with another moving object, we recognize, once more, the dialectic principle of contradiction. This principle implies that a thing has a given quality and, at the same time, does not have it. In regard to comparatives, the statement that something is tall and at the same time small, namely when viewed within two different frames of reference, is equally characteristic of mature judgments. Such a statement cannot be captured easily within a logic of classes and relations.
Dialectic thinking emphasizes the interdependence of form and content.
In its narrow sense, it deals with tI'e interrelationship between methods and results, in its most general sense, between subject and object. As one person pronounces a judgment, he externalizes a standard which will direct and modify another person's judgment, which, once it too has been pronounced, will produce further modifications. Thus, these interactions set a process in motion which is in continuous flux and only temporarily at rest, namely at -18-those moments in which a pronouncement takes place. Such a process of evaluation and reevaluation characterizes the thoughts and judgments of adult persons.
In regard to aged persons it has been proposed that processes of simplification and rigidification have altered their mode of conceptualization (and action).
But such an evaluation holds only if their thinking is considered to be preceded by all four periods of Piaget's theory and compared against the standards set for the last of these periods, i.e., of formal operations. If dialectic thinking emerges directly from any of the earlier levels of operations, an interpretation of cognitive aging will result which is free of the negative and prescientific notion of deficiency. Uncritical adherence to traditional educational and academic goals have made.? us firmly believe, however, that development has always to proceed through all of the four periods; the further a person advances in his progression, the more successful his development is considered to be. The option to be proposed, which allows that dialectic or mature thinking might emerge from any one of the succeeding periods, opens new perspectives for the study and understanding of adult thinking and successful aging (Riegel, 1972 a, c) .
As the following review reveals, previous investigations of cognitive and linguistic development have failed to provide adequate interpretations.
Cognitive changes during adulthood and aging. Thus far only two studies of normal aged subjects have been conducted with tasks taken from the rich repertoire of Piagetian investigations. A few have been made with.senile older subjects by de Ajuriaguerra (see Hooper, 1972) ; several others are in preparation (see Papalia, 1972) .
The two studies rtported (Sanders, Laurendeau & Bergeron, 1966; Kominski & Coppinger, 1968 ) investigated the conservation of surface areas by means of -19-two green cardboards, described as meadows, on which two cows could graze.
By placing blocks in various positions upon the cardboards, subjects were asked whether equal amounts of grass were available to the cows. According to the evidence obtained, older adults do not conserve area as we would expect them and as older children do. They rather seem to have regressed to judgments based on their immediate perceptual impressions, much like those exhibited by younger children.
These results raise the puzzling question of the disappearance of personal knowledge. Let us consider the knowledge of the ccservation of matter.
Is it rrnceivable that a person, once he has realized that an amount of liquid remains the same when poured from one beaker into another one of different shape, can ever lose this insight? Don't we always keep knowing what we know?
In one of the two theoretical discussions on cognitive changes during adulthood and aging, Flavell (1970) argues for the "disappearance of knowledge" under conditions of serious neurophysiological damage. According to mailable information, such changes are not necessarily affecting all aging persons to a sufficient extent. Arguments against the "disappearance.
of knowledge" are based upon the distinction between competence and performance as introduced into linguistics by Chomsky and as translated into cognitive developmental psychology by Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) , thoUgh with an emphasis congruent with the traditional distinction in psychology of theoretical constructs and observable behavior.
For Chomsky, competence refers to the knowledge about language; it is intuitive, immediate, and ideal. Performance refers to the execution of -20-linguistic tasks; it is acquired, incomplete, and concrete. This distinction reflects (as well as it fails to overcome) the mind-body dualism of Descartes:
in its idealistic extension it argues for the immutability of competence or knowledge; in its mechanistic extension it proposes that competence is innate.
Chomsky himself has stayed somewhat aloof from these elaborations.
If he were to stress more strongly the interactional, i.e., the transformational aspects of his model, he could escape from these two traps. He would still fail, however, to account for the interactions of the organism with the cultural-historical conditions of the environment and, moreover, of the dialectic changes of the individual and society.
A second theoretical discussion, focusing upon the transition in cognitive operations between adolescence and adulthood, has been published by Piaget himself (1972) . Here Piaget seems to weaken his earlier interpretations by giving more attention to individual and societal differences in speed of development, developmental diversification, and professional specialization.
Originally, the four major periods in the cognitive development of the child were regarded by Piaget as universal progressions through which all children would move at about the same pace. Studies of cross-cultural and subcultural variations have often failed to confirm such an interpretation and led Piaget to suggest that the speed of progression is not the same under all social conditions, but may produce retardation in deprived and accelerations in stimulating surroundings. Differences between groups are especially marked at the later periods of development; during the early periods, tite progression seems to be most uniform. The same type of intuitive conquest characterizes even more appropriately the performance at levels below those of formal operational intelligence.
For all these reasons, Piaget's theory describes thought in its alienation from its creative, dialectic basis. It represents a prototype reflecting the goals of our higher educational systein which, in turn, are reflecting the nonartistic and noncreative aspects in the intellectual history of western man (Riegel, 1972b, d) . Although, Piaget's theory is founded on a dialectic basis, it fails to make the transition from the formal intellectualism of Kant to the concrete dialecticism of Hegel. Thus, his theory is not only incapable of interpreting mature thinking but, in his interpretation, also the cognitions of children (increasing with age) lose their dialectic character and, thus, their creative features. A commitment tcjiegel enables us to reinterpret Piaget's theory with due consideration of mature and creative thinking.
It leads us to an extension and modification of Piaget's model of cognitive progression.
A modified model of cognitive development. In a recent publication (Riegel, 1972e) , we discussed three models of qualitative, developmental changes.
These models were derived from the earlier work by Van den Daele (1969) .
In both publicati ns, Piaget's theory of cognitive development was considered to represent the simplest of all three models, the single sequence Recently Furth (1973) has maintained that Piaget does not "pretend that stages of thinking reached in one domain will necessarily be found in the Presumably the further the child has advanced in his development, the harder it will be to-"regress" to the "naive" mode of early conceptualization.
For this reason, the growth of cognitive organization, as depicted in any of these models, represents an alienation from original thought. Dialectic operations represent a further step forward and, at the same time, a return to early thinking which, in the opinion of many writers (e.g., Stern, Werner, Freud, Zeininger, Levi-Strauss, et al.) , is dialectic in nature.
As shown in Figure 1 , we propose that an individual at any developmental level may directly progress to its corresponding mode of dialectic operations, In other words, the option for multi-level operations contradicts Piaget's notion of equilibration since it reintroduces dialectic conflict; the emphasis upon equilibration would tend to resolve this conflict at the expense of the thinking at the earlier stage. Our own modification recognizes dialectic conflicts and contradiction as a fundamental property of thought. In contrast to Piaget, we maintain that at the levels of dialectic operations at maturity, the individual does not necessarily equilibrate these conflicts, but is ready to live with these contradictions; stronger yet, the individual accepts these contradictions as a basic property of thought and creativity.
Conclusion
The purpose of our discussion was to reintroduce dialecticism into Piaget's theory of cognitive development. According to our interpretation, Piaget's theory is founded upon dialectic thinking but, successively, each higher level of operation leads to further alienation from this original mode of thinking. Dialectic operations represent mature thought to which an individual might progress from any one of the four stages in Piaget's theory, i.e., without necessarily progressing first through all four of them in their proper order. This option to operate simultaneously or in short succession at different levels also implies that an individual might perform in one area of concern at one level of thinking and in another area at another level. It implies contradiction and is dialectic in character.
Our modification and extension of Piaget's theory to the level of dialectic operations is concerned with intrapsychic processes. At other occasions (Riegel, 1972b (Riegel, , 1973a , we have called attention to the need for expanding Piaget's theory in at least two other directions.
First, the interaction between psychic activities and their biological basis need to be explored more fully. Undoubtedly, Piaget's orientation is basically a biological one but it is evolutionary-systematic rather than analytic-experimental. In our opinion, the modern version of Pavlov's reflexology comes closest to fulfilling our expectations by exploring an interactive, dialectical model which relates psychic activities to their biological and (in its narrower explication) material foundation.
Second, the interaction between psychic activities and the culturalhistorical conditions need to be explored more fully (see Meacham, 1972) .
For
Piaget, the individual, through his own activities, creates his conceptual world.
But the activities of and within the environment are disregarded. These activities exert their effects upon the individual through their specific structures (which, through ceaseless efforts of mankind have produced widely differing cultural-historical conditions), as well as through the participatory efforts of parents, siblings, teachers (which, as much as the developing child, ought to be considered as active organisms). A developmental theory emphasizing the interactions between psychic activities and those of the culturalhistorical conditions has been proposed by Soviet psychologists, notably Vigotsky, Luria and Leont'ev. A theory integrating both interaction systems and, thus, regarding psychic activities and development in their joint interaction with both inner biological and outer cultural historical conditions has been proposed by S. L. Rubinstein (see Payne, 1968; Riegel, 1972b Riegel, , 1973a Wozniak, 1972 Either a sentence or its negation are true. Traditionally, these "laws of thought" were regarded as a sufficient foundation for the whole of logic;
Kant's analytical judgments, for example, are those for which the law of contradiction suffices as proof. 3 The adequacy of positivistic thinking for modern natural sciences has been emphasized by Petzoldt (1912) Recently, Elkind (1967) , Hooper (1969) , and Papalia and Hooper (1971) proposed and investigated the theoretical distinction between identity and equivalence judgments in conservation tasks. The first'is assessed by presenting two objects which are equal both in physical appearance and criteria content, such as weight, the second by deforming the appearance of one of the objects.
The above-mentioned authors have argued that lack of conservation is, generally, tested by demonstrating failure in equivalence judgments without prior assessment of identity judgments. The conceptual distinction proposed and the results reported do not need to be elaborated here. Our own discussion is exclusively concerned with the identity relation. In contrast to formal interpretations, we emphasize that under deformation the two objects are identical (e.g., in regard to their substance) but, at the same time, are not identical (e.g., in regard to their form).
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